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A B S T R A C T
We examine the role of the international credit channel in Turkey over 2005–2013. We show that larger,
more capitalized banks with higher non-core liabilities increase credit supply when capital inﬂows are
higher. This result is stronger for domestic banks relative to foreign banks and survives during the crisis
period of post-2008, when foreign banks in general stop lending in emerging markets and retreat to their
home countries. By decomposing capital inﬂows into bank and non-bank ﬂows, we show the importance of
domestic banks’ external borrowing for domestic credit growth.
© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
A central question in international macroeconomics is the trans-
mission of real and ﬁnancial shocks across countries. As shown by
many, international banking linkages have a special role in such
transmission.1 The role of common ﬁnancial shocks is particulary
important, where during crisis times, global banks stop lending in
many countries at once. A special period is the aftermath of the
Global Financial Crisis, when banking ﬂows were mainly directed
towards emerging market economies (EMEs), given the ultra low
interest rates in advanced countries. As shownbyMorais et al. (2015),
* Corresponding author at: ICREA-UPF, Barcelona GSE, and CREI, Spain.
E-mail addresses: Soner.Baskaya@tcmb.gov.tr (Y.S. Baskaya),
julian.digiovanni@upf.edu (J. Giovanni), kalemli@econ.umd.edu (S¸. Kalemli-Özcan),
jose.peydro@upf.edu (J.-L. Peydro), fatih.ulu@tcmb.gov.tr (M.F. Ulu).
1 See among others Kalemli-Özcan et al. (2013a), Kalemli-Özcan et al. (2013b),
Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011), Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012), Claessens and van
Horen (2013), de Haas and van Leylveld (2014), Cerutti et al. (2017), Peek
and Rosengren (2000), Schnabl (2012), de Haas and van Horen (2013), and Ongena
et al. (2015).
US and European monetary policies affect the supply of credit from
foreign banks to local ﬁrms in Mexico.
This paper takes a deeper look at the aggregate credit cycles of
an important EME, Turkey, focusing on the role of domestic banks
in order to better understand what drives the linkages between the
international capital ﬂows and the domestic credit market, i.e., the
international credit channel. Unlike Mexico, the typical emerging
market country does not have a high concentration of foreign banks,
such that their lending is large enough to affect aggregate ﬁnanc-
ing conditions, and thus domestic output. In fact, in Turkey, foreign
banks only account for 12% of the domestic loan provision. Hence,
we would like to know how the rest of the domestic banking sec-
tor responds in terms of credit supply when domestic banks can also
borrow externally during periods of increased international banking
ﬂows. To achieve this goal, we use a unique data set from Turkey
between 2005–2013, that covers the universe of loans extended to
ﬁrms by the universe of banks operating in Turkey, and thus both
domestic and foreign banks.
Furthermore, we also explore the importance of several key bank
characteristics in order to better understand which types of banks
are most affected by capital inﬂows over the cycle. We focus on three
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2016.12.003
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key variables: size, the risk-weighted capital ratio, and the non-core
liabilities ratio. The ﬁrst two variables have been explored in the
literature (Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Jiménez et al., 2012; Jiménez
et al., 2014) while the focus on the non-core ratio is more novel, and
is motivated by recent work by Hahm et al. (2013) who show that
this “non-traditional” formof ﬁnancing is associatedwith greater risk
taking in the banking sector. This type of ﬁnancing is different than
traditional deposit ﬁnancing and hence more likely to be linked to
international capitalmarkets andhence sensitive toglobal conditions.
Finally,we ask how the cyclical behavior of lending varies across bank
characteristics for different types of capital ﬂows. This line of inquiry
is motivated by the recent ﬁndings of Blanchard et al. (2015), who
show that non-bond ﬁnancing has expansionary effects in countries
with ﬁnancial frictions. We show that in the case of Turkey where
domestic banks intermediate the capital ﬂows, the most important
form of debt ﬂows for domestic credit expansion is banking ﬂows. In
the aggregate cross-country data. Blanchard et al. (2015) ﬁnds “other”
ﬂows are expansionary and “portfolio debt” ﬂows are not. We also
measure banking ﬂows using the “other” component of capital ﬂows
into Turkey. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant effect in terms of domestic credit
supply by larger and high non-core liability banks during periods of
high portfolio debt ﬂows, whereas banking ﬂows captured by other
capital ﬂows component drive our main results.2
Our identiﬁcation methodology relies on the granularity of the
credit register data we exploit, which allow us to use borrower
(ﬁrm) × quarter ﬁxed effects. These ﬁxed effects allow us to control
for unobserved and time-varying ﬁrm fundamentals that are corre-
latedwith credit demand, such as ﬁrm quality, riskiness and ﬁnancial
constraints. We can employ such an identiﬁcation strategy since in
our data roughly 50% of ﬁrms borrow from multiple banks on aver-
age over the sample period (representing roughly 75% of the total
value of loans outstanding), as opposed to a typical credit register
data in an emerging market, where this number is around 15–20%.
Moreover, we control for bank–ﬁrm ﬁxed effects, that apart from
controlling for time-invariant bank characteristics such as owner-
ship, also control for sticky relationships between ﬁrms and banks
such as relationship lending.
Our key results are as follows. First, we show that banks with
higher non-core ﬁnancing extend more credit during periods of high
capital inﬂows. Second, larger banks and banks with higher risk-
weighted capital ratios also extend more credit during such periods.
The result on bank size is interesting, given that the opposite result
is usually found for industrial countries where smaller banks extend
more credit when monetary conditions are loose (e.g., Kashyap and
Stein, 2000). It has also been found for advanced countries that
low capital ratio banks extend more credit during episodes of low
interest rates (e.g., Jiménez et al., 2012, 2014).
One potential explanation for the contrasting results is the fol-
lowing. The literature studying industrial countries is focused on the
impact of local monetary policy, which has a larger impact onweaker
banks in their local lending, as these banks are more constrained and
need the additional liquidity. However, when focusing on the impact
of capital ﬂows in an EME, it is the larger, stronger capitalized banks
that can take advantage of the global ﬁnancial conditions in order to
intermediate the ﬂows towards the local credit markets.
Our results are not driven by foreign banks, as we show all the
results both with the full sample of banks, as well as with a narrower
sample of domestic banks. We also ﬁnd that during the 2008–2013
period, when advanced countries had low interest rates that lead
to capital ﬂows into EMs, it was the domestic banks with higher
non-core ﬁnancing that continued to extend credit relatively more
than the foreign banks. This result resonates with the ﬁnding of
2 Banks with a higher risk-weighted capital ratio supply more credit when portfolio
debt ﬂows are high, but this result is not robust across different speciﬁcations.
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Fig. 1. Total Turkish capital inﬂows and banks’ non-core ﬁnancing, 2003–2013. Notes:
This ﬁgure plots Turkey’s total capital inﬂows/GDP ratio, and the median’s bank non-
core liabilities ratio, over time. Both series are four-quarter moving averages.
Source: All data are sourced from the CBRT.
Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011, 2012), where credit contraction by for-
eign banks in the host country depend on the tighter conditions in
their home countries.
Our results highlight the importance of capital ﬂows, in partic-
ular banking ﬂows, in linking international and domestic cycles via
larger and well capitalized banks who can fund themselves in the
international capital markets which will be reﬂected in their higher
non-core liability ratio. The importance of banks’ non-core ﬁnanc-
ing is a key result. As argued by Hahm et al. (2013), banks are the
most important ﬁnancial intermediaries and they must raise fund-
ing in order to lend to their borrowers. When credit is growing
faster than the pool of available retail deposits, the bank will turn
to other sources of funding to support its credit growth. In the case
of an emerging market like Turkey, this other source is the interna-
tional capital market. Given the low interest rates in the advanced
economies, international capital ﬂowed into EMEs and hence pro-
vided the basis of non-core ﬁnancing for domestic banks. As shown
in Fig. 1, the ratio of non-core liabilities to total liabilities moved
one-for-one with capital ﬂows for the median domestic bank. In this
sense, our paper is related to but different from the literature we cite
above, which explores how foreign-owned banks vs. foreign funded
locally-owned banks transmit shocks. Further, most of the existing
papers have examined the transmission of crisis shocks rather than
capital inﬂows and outﬂows over a cycle, as we do in this paper.3
We also contribute to the literature that tries to identify the
credit supply channel of monetary policy (Bernanke and Gertler,
1995; Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Jiménez et al., 2012), although we
focus on capital ﬂows instead of domestic and/or foreign mone-
tary policy. Some of these papers also analyze loan-level data at the
monthly/quarterly frequency with borrower (or borrower-period)
ﬁxed effects, exactly as we do. Period ﬁxed effects will capture the
direct effect of capital ﬂows and also global shocks and monetary
policies as in other work. Differently than this literature, we show
that capital ﬂows lead stronger banks to extend more credit.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy discusses the
Turkish banking system, and its evolution over time. Section 3 dis-
cusses the data. Section 4 presents our identiﬁcation methodology.
Section 5 describes the empirical results, and Section 6 concludes.
3 Baskaya et al. (2017) go a step further and focus on what global factors drive the
capital inﬂows, and show that an important part of domestic credit growth can be
explained by capital ﬂow push-factors, and in particular by movements in global risk
aversion, proxied by VIX, which impact real borrowing costs.
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2. Banking environment in Turkey
As of 2016, the Turkish banking industry, which corresponds to
approximately 90% of the entire ﬁnancial sector, consists of 52 active
institutions. In terms of the key activities, 34 banks in Turkey can
be classiﬁed as deposit banks. Among the remaining, 13 banks are
categorized as investment and development banks and 5 banks are
categorized as participation banks. While the investment and devel-
opment banks are mainly engaged in ﬁnancing investment, they
differ from the deposit banks in the sense that they are not allowed
to collect deposits. The participation banks, which constitute around
6% of the banking industry in Turkey, differ fundamentally from the
other banks in terms of how banking service is conducted. In partic-
ular, they offer Islamic banking services, where they are not licensed
to accept conventional deposits, but they can accept funds into par-
ticipation accounts which are not associated with a conventional
interest rate.
In terms of ownership structure, one categorization can be made
with respect to whether the bank is state-owned and privately
owned, whereas an alternative categorization can be made with
respect to whether the key majority owner is domestic or foreign.
According to the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA)
in Turkey, 20 deposit banks (out of 34), 4 investment and develop-
ment banks (out of 13), and 3 participation banks (out of 5) have
majority foreign ownership, deﬁned as having foreign share larger
than 50% of common equity capital. Among these foreign banks, 6 of
them operate as branches and the rest as subsidiaries.
The Turkish credit market and the role of banks have transformed
dramatically over the past few decades. In the 1990s, the Turkish
banking sector was characterized by a large number of banks, that
were mostly involved in ﬁnancing the ﬁscal deﬁcits by holding a
large share of government securities in their asset portfolios. The high
public sector borrowing requirement and resulting high ex-ante real
interest rates on the government debt securities further resulted in a
substantial crowding-out of investment, consumption expenditures,
anddemand for credit.4 Following the 2001 crisis in Turkey, therewas
a series of banking reforms that transformed the banking industry
where banks have high capital adequacy and liquidity ratios, as well
as low level of non-performing loan ratios. Banks switched their
activity to providing credit to the private sector from ﬁnancing the
government debt. The growing availability of credit also allowed
households and small andmedium enterprises to increase borrowing
and expand consumption and investment expenditures.
Turkey experienced a very rapid credit growth in the last decade,
where credit growth was reached a high of 40% in 2010. With the
rapid increase in the credit stock, the loan to GDP ratio also marked a
substantial increase, reaching approximately 88% at the end of 2014,
which implied that the loan-to-GDP ratio more than doubled since
the mid-2000s.
3. Data
All data are sourced from the CBRT. We combine bank-level char-
acteristics with individual loan-level data between banks and ﬁrms
using unique bank and ﬁrm identiﬁers. We further augment this
dataset with capital inﬂow data for Turkey. The ﬁnal dataset is at
the quarterly frequency. We transform all loan and bank, variables
to real values, using 2003 as the base year for inﬂation adjustment.5
We discuss brieﬂy discuss the characteristics of each dataset in this
section, and refer the interested reader to Baskaya et al. (2017) for
more details.
4 See Baskaya and Kalemli-Özcan (2016).
5 We further clean and winsorize the data in order to eliminate the impact of
outliers, where we winsorize 1% of the data for the loan and bank variables.
3.1. Bank-level data
Turkey has a bank-dominated ﬁnancial sector, where in 2014,
banks held 86% of the country’s ﬁnancial assets and roughly 90% of
total ﬁnancial liabilities. The past decade has witnessed a doubling
of bank deposits and assets, while loans have increased ﬁve-fold: by
2013 the banking sector’s assets representedmore than 100% of GDP,
and loans roughly 70%.
Our baseline analysis uses quarterly bank balance sheet data from
Turkey for the 2003–2013 period.6 All banks operatingwithin Turkey
are required to report their balance sheets as well as extra items to
the regulatory and supervisory authorities — such as the CBRT and
the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA) — by the end
of the month. We also use extra reporting of the banks, such as their
capital adequacy ratios.
Our sample period is over the 2003–2013, and the number of
banks varies from between 35 and 44 throughout the period due to
entry and exit, as well as our focus on loans to only the corporate
sector. Table 1 presents summary statistics for our ﬁnal sample of
banks, based on end-of-quarter data pooled over the sample period.
These variables, like others used in the paper, are winsorized at the
one-percent level. There is quite a bit of variation in bank size, as
measured by total assets as noted above. Similarly, there is variation
in the capital, liquidity, and return on assets (ROA) across banks and
over time. The non-core liabilities ratio, which averages 0.30 in the
sample, and has wide variation across banks and over time (the stan-
dard deviation is 0.22 in the pooled data). This variable measures the
ratio of “non-traditional” (or wholesale) liabilities to total liabilities.7
3.2. Credit register
Our detailedmonthly bank–ﬁrm individual loan transaction-level
data are collected by the BRSA, and provided to us by the CBRT. Banks
have to report the outstanding loans at the level of ﬁrms and indi-
viduals monthly to the BRSA at the transaction level. Baskaya et al.
(2017) describe these data in detail and how they are cleaned along
various dimensions, including to deal with valuation effects for loans
denominated in foreign currency, which arise due to exchange rate
movements. We adjust the individual loans for inﬂation before sum-
ming across bank–ﬁrm pairs. Further, given our empirical strategy as
described in Section 4, we only end up using credit register data for
the 2005–2013 period, so present summary statistics based on this
sample period.
Table 2 reports some key statistics on the coverage of the credit
register data based on end-of-year data. Column (1) presents the
ratio of corporate loans to total loans for all ﬁrms in the dataset,8
while column (2) presents the same ratio for loans for the ﬁnal
bank–ﬁrm–quarter pairs that are included in our regressions. The
difference in sample is due to pairs being dropped from the inclu-
sion of ﬁrms × quarter ﬁxed effects, which eliminate ﬁrms that only
have one banking relationship in a given time period. In comparing
columns (1) and (2), two crucial facts stand out: (i) the regression
sample represents roughly 75% of total corporate loans over the sam-
ple period, increasing over time, and (ii) the correlation between
the ratios for the whole dataset and the regression sample is 0.99.
Therefore, the ultimate sample of loans we use in the regression is
representative of the whole corporate sector.
6 The data are collected at the monthly level, and we simply use March, June,
September, and December reports.
7 These liabilities are the sum of (i) payables to money market, (ii) payables to
securities, (iii) payables to banks, (iv) funds from Repo, and (v) securities issued (net).
8 Overall, the growth rate of loans in the corporate sector mirrors that of the whole
economy over the sample period, where the two series track each other very closely,
with a correlation of 0.86.
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Table 1
Bank-level quarterly summary statistics, based on oﬃcial bank-level balance sheet data, 2005–2013.
Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Max.
log(Total Real Assets) 1392 14.53 14.55 2.230 8.387 18.31
Capital Adequacy Ratio 1356 0.210 0.186 0.065 0.128 0.296
Liquidity Ratio 1392 0.390 0.327 0.216 0.018 0.960
Non-core Ratio 1392 0.300 0.228 0.223 0.000 0.907
ROA 1392 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.000 0.033
Notes: This table presents summary statistics using quarterly data pooled over the 2005–2013 period. ‘Total Real Assets’ are banks’ assets deﬂated to 2003. The ‘Capital Adequacy
Ratio’ is the Tier 1 risk-weighted capital ratio; the ‘Liquidity Ratio’ is liquid assets over total assets; the ‘Non-core Ratio’ is non-core liabilities divided by total liabilities; and ‘ROA’
is return on total assets. Non-core liabilities = Payables to money market+Payables to securities+Payables to banks+Funds from Repo+Securities issued (net).
Table 3 next reports summary statistics on banks, ﬁrms, and
bank–ﬁrm pairs in the register for the end of year. The ﬁrst row,
‘Total’, presents statistics for the whole period, while the second row,
‘Average’ presents results based on an average year. As column (1)
shows, the number of banks was roughly constant throughout the
period, though we note that there was a slight increase in the latter
period. There are roughly 3.7 million ﬁrms with loans outstanding
over the 2005–2013 period, with an average of roughly four hundred
thousand per period. We should also note that there was a steady
increase of ﬁrmsborrowingover the sampleperiod (seeBaskaya et al.,
2017, for more details). The total number of bank–ﬁrm–quarter pairs
in the full sample of data is roughly 5.3million (column (5)), with 488
thousand pairs per quarter on average. Of these observations, ﬁrms
with multiple bank relationships (column (4)) make up roughly 50%
of total observations throughout the sample period and on average,
while the loan share of these ﬁrms viz. total loan value is roughly 75%
(‘Loan Share in Multiple BF’, column (6)). Finally, the average num-
ber of banking relationships a given ﬁrm has over the sample is 1.4
(column (7)). The high degree of ﬁrms borrowing frommultiple bank
is crucial for our identiﬁcation strategy outlined in Section 4.
Table 4 presents summary statistics for the credit register data
for loans aggregated at the bank–ﬁrm pair each quarter. The table
reports summary statistics for loans outstanding in thousands of
2003 TL, both for the complete data set as well as for the of
bank–ﬁrm pairs that we use in the regression speciﬁcations, which
take into account dropped observations due to the inclusion of the
ﬁrm × quarter effects. As can be seen, we lose over half of the sam-
ple of bank–ﬁrm observations when we condition on the additional
ﬁxed effects, but we are still with close to nine million observations.
Moreover, these loans tend to be larger on average than the average
loan in the whole sample of corporate loans.
4. Empirical methodology
Ourempiricalmethodology follows theapproachused in thecredit
register literature,by focusingonmultiplebank–ﬁrmrelationships for
Table 2
Credit register coverage: corporate sector, 2005–2013.
(1) (2)
All Sample
2005 0.396 0.254
2006 0.455 0.329
2007 0.465 0.338
2008 0.498 0.375
2009 0.500 0.378
2010 0.568 0.433
2011 0.590 0.455
2012 0.623 0.499
2013 0.636 0.492
Notes: This table presents annual summary statistics of
the credit register coverage of loans, over the 2005–2013
period, using end-of-year data. Column (1) presents rate
of corporate to all loans, while column (2) presents statis-
tics based on the sample that includes loans for bank–ﬁrm
pairs where ﬁrm borrow from multiple banks.
estimating the impact of capital ﬂows on credit volume and lending
rates (see Khwaja and Mian, 2008, who pioneered the approach of
exploiting information on ﬁrms’ borrowing relationships in credit
register data to identify the bank lending channel). We extend the
two-period ﬁrst-difference estimation of Khwaja and Mian (2008),
as in Jiménez et al. (2012, 2014) into multiple periods ﬁxed effects
estimation in order to exploit the panel data at our disposable. Given
the fact that error term is not a randomwalk, a ﬁxed effect estimation
(FE) dominates a ﬁrst difference (FD) estimation.9
We begin with data at the monthly transaction level loan data.
However, given that capital inﬂows data are at the quarterly level
and we are interested in examining their interaction with bank-level
characteristics, we exploit loan data at the ﬁrm ( f)–bank (b)–quarter
(t) level to use as our unit of analysis. All explanatory variables are
either expressed in real terms or as ratios. We regress the loan vari-
able, in logs, on the capital inﬂows-to-GDP ratio interactedwith bank
characteristics, which are predetermined average values. We further
augment the regression with time-varying bank-level variables and
crucially ﬁrm × quarter ﬁxed effects, which capture credit demand.
Regressions are all weighted-least square, where weights equal log
loans at the {f, b} level in a given quarter t. Finally, standard errors
are clustered at the institution level.
The regression speciﬁcation thus takes the form:
log(Loanf ,b,t) = af ,b + af ,t + b
(
Capital inﬂows
GDP
)
t−1
× Bankb
+cOther Bankb,t−1 + ef ,b,t , (1)
where Bank is a beginning-of-period average value, which is either
the bank’s (i) size (measured as log(assets)), (ii) capital adequacy
ratio (CAR), or (iii) or non-core liabilities ratio. In our analysis, we
consider the possibility that the endogenous response of bank char-
acteristics to banks’ credit supply behavior and capital ﬂows can
bias our estimates. Therefore, we take averages over the observa-
tions in the 2003q1–2004q4 period as the predetermined values of
the bank-level characteristics. Our baseline speciﬁcation includes all
three interaction terms in one speciﬁcation.10
The matrix of “other” time-varying bank-level characteristics,
Other Bank, includes t− 1 values of the three interacted variables as
controls, as well a banks’ return on asset and their liquidity ratio.11
5. Empirical results
Our empirical analysis mainly focuses on three issues. First, we
analyzewhether there is heterogeneity of procyclicality of bank lend-
ing such that the banks with different characteristics, such as size,
9 We run an AR(1) on error terms and ﬁnd no evidence of persistence.
10 Note that we build the interaction term by ﬁrst demeaning the capital inﬂows-to-
GDP variable in order to quantify the total effects below.
11 We use ROA rather than non-performing loans as a control, since ROA reﬂects bad
loans and write-offs and hence a more comprehensive variable for bank proﬁts. This
also helps with sample coverage, since the NPL variable was missing for longer time
periods for several banks.
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Table 3
Credit register sample coverage of bank–ﬁrm relationships, 2005–2013.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Bank–ﬁrm relationship
Banks Firms Single Multiple Total Loan share
multiple BF
Av. no. rel.
per ﬁrm
Total 44 3,725,368 2,880,800 2,418,916 5,299,716 0.747 1.42
Average 39 413,930 320,089 268,768 588,857 0.757 1.41
Notes: This table presents summary statistics on the frequency of different types of bank–ﬁrm relationships within the credit register using end-of-year data. The ‘Total’ row
presents statistics based on the whole sample period, while the ‘Average’ row presents statistics based on averaging across years. Columns (1) and (2) list the number of banks and
ﬁrms, respectively (note that the ‘Total’ number represents the maximum number of banks in a given year over the sample period); column (3) lists the number of observations
where a ﬁrm has a unique banking relationship; column (4) lists the number of observations where a ﬁrm has multiple banking relationships; column (5) lists the total number
of bank–ﬁrm relationships. Column (6) presents the share of loans (relative to total) from ﬁrms with multiple bank relationships, and column (7) presents the average number of
multiple banking relationships a ﬁrm has in a given year.
Table 4
Credit register quarterly summary statistics, bank–ﬁrm level, all loans, 2005–2013.
Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Max.
Panel A. All loans
Loan 19,624,894 135.2 34.84 401.7 1.063 3789
Panel B. Regression sample
Loan 7,975,254 225.7 58.70 535.5 1.063 3789
Notes: This table presents summary statistics using quarterly data for aggregate bank–
ﬁrm transactions over the 2005–2013 period. The second panel sample includes loans
for all bank–ﬁrm pairs with multiple relationships. ‘Loan’ is the end-of-quarter total
outstanding principal for all loans between a bank–ﬁrm pair, in thousands of Turkish
lira and adjusted for inﬂation.
capital adequacy and non-core liabilities, differ in terms of supplying
loans in response to capital inﬂows.12 Second, we look at whether
domestic banks play a signiﬁcant role in transmitting the capital
inﬂows into loan outcomes. Finally, we analyze the heterogeneity in
bank lending in response to different types of capital ﬂows.
Given that the data vary at the ﬁrm–bank–quarter level, Eq. (1)
allows us to interpret the coeﬃcients on the interactions between
capital inﬂows and the predetermined bank characteristics as the
differential credit supply effect of capital inﬂows with respect to
banks’ characteristics. In particular, our speciﬁcation includes (i) the
bank × ﬁrm ﬁxed effects, af,b, which account for any time-invariant
unobserved characteristics related to the bank–ﬁrm relationship,
and (ii) ﬁrm × quarter ﬁxed effects, af,t, which account for the time-
varying latent ﬁrm characteristics affecting the loan outcomes such
as the loan demand by the ﬁrm. Therefore, with the inclusion of these
factors, we disentangle the bank credit supply-related variations in
the loan outcomes.
5.1. Bank-level heterogeneity
Column (1) of Table 5 presents the estimation results for
regression (1) using the sample of all banks, i.e., both foreign and
domestic, for the 2005–2013 period. We ﬁrst note that the lending
of the larger banks are more sensitive to capital inﬂows than smaller
ones. In other words, the loan supplied by the larger banks are more
procyclical with respect to the capital inﬂows. In terms of quantities,
ceteris paribus, a bank at the 75th percentile of the size distribution
increases its lending by an additional 0.6 percentage points com-
pared to the median bank, when capital inﬂows increase by 10%.
In the case of a one standard deviation increase in the total capi-
tal inﬂows to GDP ratio (i.e. 4.6 percentage points increase) from its
12 As shown in Baskaya et al. (2017), exogenous capital inﬂows driven by low
global risk (VIX) have an expansionary effect on domestic credit in Turkey during
2003–2013.
Table 5
Capital inﬂows and bank-level heterogeneity, 2005–2013.
(1) (2)
All Domestic
(K Inﬂows/GDP)t−1× Sizeb 0.036∗ 0.108∗
(0.010) (0.012)
(K Inﬂows/GDP)t−1× Non-coreb 0.903∗ 3.645∗
(0.182) (0.233)
(K Inﬂows/GDP)t−1× CARb 0.672∗ 0.928∗
(0.046) (0.052)
Observations 7,975,254 5,260,236
R-squared 0.914 0.902
Bank × ﬁrm F.E. Yes Yes
Firm × quarter F.E. Yes Yes
Bank controls Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents results for the regressions (Eq. (1)) using quarterly data for
all loans. The lagged values of the following bank-level characteristics are also con-
trolled for (not reported completely in all speciﬁcations): log(assets), capital adequacy
ratio (CAR), liquidity ratio, non-core liabilities ratio, and return on total assets (ROA).
The interacted capital inﬂow and bank-level variables are demeaned before being
interacted. Regressions are all weighted-least square, where weights are equal to the
natural logarithm of loans. Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level.
∗ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
mean value (7.6%), a bank at the 75th percentile of the size distribu-
tion increases its lending by an extra 3.5 percentage points compared
to median bank.
Setting the bank characteristics at their mean values over 2003–
2004 for size (log(Assets) = 16.35), non-core ratio (0.139), and
capital adequacy ratio (0.384), and using the estimated coeﬃ-
cients in column (1), a one standard deviation increase in capital
inﬂows above its sample average, i.e., a 60% increase, implies a 4.4%
increase in loans. This is equivalent to saying that the elasticity of
loans with respect to capital ﬂows is 0.07 for banks with average
characteristics.13 To gauge the importance of bank heterogeneity
quantitatively, we next apply the same change in capital inﬂows to
values of bank size, non-core ratio, and capital adequacy ratio set at
values equal to the 75th percentile (17.34, 0.177, and 0.770, respec-
tively) as well as at the 25th percentile (15.28, 0.093, and 0.161,
respectively) values of their distributions. The comparative statics for
the interquartile difference in the distribution of bank characteristics
imply a 5.9% and 3.4% increase in loans, respectively.
Finally, we ﬁnd that the banks with higher capital adequacy ratios
increase their lending more in response to capital inﬂows. Keeping
all other bank characteristics constant, a bank at the 75th percentile
of the capital adequacy ratio lends by an extra 0.74 percentage points
compared to the median bank in response to 1% increase in capi-
tal ﬂows. In the case that the capital inﬂows ratio increases by one
13 Recall that capital ﬂows are demeaned and all bank variables are 2003–2004
averaged values.
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standard deviation from its sample mean value, a bank at the 75th
percentile of the capital adequacy ratio distribution lends an extra
4.48 percentage points compared to the median bank.
The literature has by and large focused on the sensitivity of
bank lending to international capital ﬂows arising from the pres-
ence of foreign banks (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011, 2012). However,
the distinct role of the domestic banks in the transmission of for-
eign liquidity has not been emphasized in the literature to date,
despite the potential importance of these banks. In order to provide
insights into whether domestic banks are also important in driving
the procyclicality of bank lending with respect to capital inﬂows, we
estimate Eq. (1) using only the sample of domestic banks operating
in Turkey. The results of this regression are presented in column (2)
of Table 5. There is a signiﬁcant heterogeneity in the procyclicality of
lending by Turkish domestic banks in response to the capital inﬂows.
In particular, as in the case of the sample for all banks in column (1),
the lending by domestic banks with a larger size, more capitaliza-
tion and a higher non-core liabilities are more responsive to capital
inﬂows.
5.2. Transmission of capital inﬂows to bank lending in Turkey before
and after the 2008 crisis
We next ask whether the sensitivity of bank lending to capital
ﬂows changed with the Global Financial Crisis in 2008. To do so,
we estimate Eq. (1) separately for the 2005Q1–2008Q2 and the
2008Q3–2013Q4 periods. Table 6 presents results of these regres-
sions, where the ﬁrst three columns consider all banks, while the last
three columns focus on domestic banks only.
First, turning to sample of all banks, columns (2) and (3) consider
the pre/post sample split, while column (1) repeats the results for
the whole sample. In looking at columns (2) and (3), we ﬁnd that
there is a change in the sensitivity of different bank characteristics
to capita inﬂows in the pre- and post-crisis periods. In particular, we
ﬁnd that larger and more capitalized banks increased their lending
in response to capital ﬂows relative to smaller and less capitalized
banks both before and after the crisis. However, the point estimates
are smaller in the post-crisis period. Looking at the interaction with
the non-core ratio, we ﬁnd a more striking result: there is a procycli-
cality of banks’ lending behavior with respect to capital inﬂows given
the size of their non-core liabilitiesmainly in the pre-crises period, as
suggested by a positive and signiﬁcant interaction term for 2005Q1–
2008Q2 period, but we ﬁnd no such heterogeneity with respect to
non-core liability ratio in the post-2008Q3 period.
This non-ﬁnding on the non-core liabilities interaction in the
post-crisis period is puzzling given that this period corresponds to
industrial countries quantitative easy, and the uptick in capital ﬂows
to EMEs. Arguably, it is precisely these capital inﬂows that EM banks
took advantage of to expand their domestic lending, and did so
via the expansion of their non-core liabilities. To investigate this
possibility, we narrow our focus to domestic banks.
Columns (5) and (6) of Table 6 present the regression results
for domestic banks for the pre- and post-crisis periods. As with
the whole sample of banks, in columns (2) and (3), we ﬁnd that
domestic banks in Turkey have shown signiﬁcant heterogeneity both
before and after the crises in their lending behavior following capital
inﬂowswhen considering both size the CAR. Further, like the all bank
sample, the coeﬃcients for the interaction terms decrease in abso-
lute value. More interestingly, we ﬁnd that the non-core liabilities
ratio of the banks still played a signiﬁcant role in the heterogeneous
transmission of capital ﬂows to banks’ lending both before and after
the crisis.
5.3. The role of different components of capital ﬂows
Figs. 1 and 2 show aggregate capital ﬂows into Turkey and
their components over the 2003–2013 period, respectively. There
is considerable heterogeneity in terms of the variations in the sub-
components of the capital ﬂows. Though FDI is slightly larger than
the other two ﬂows for roughly one quarter of the sample period,
it is the least volatile component, with a standard deviation around
one third of the standard deviation of total capital ﬂows. Portfolio
inﬂows, which are approximately equal to FDI ﬂows, have a stan-
dard deviation equal to almost half of that of total capital inﬂows.
Finally, other inﬂows, which make up slightly less than half of the
total capital inﬂows, is the most volatile component, with a standard
deviation around three quarters of the standard deviation of the total
inﬂows.
The three components are different from each other also in terms
of their sub-items and relevance to the banking sector. For example,
FDI ﬂows are driven by long-term returns. Theymay also be themost
illiquid by nature. The other inﬂows item, which contains lending
by foreign banks to banks in Turkey as an important subcomponent,
Table 6
Capital inﬂows and bank-level heterogeneity during regular and crisis times.
All banks Domestic banks
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
05Q1–13Q4 05Q1–08Q2 08Q3–13Q4 05Q1–13Q4 05Q1–08Q2 08Q3–13Q4
(K Inﬂows/GDP)t−1× Sizeb 0.036∗ 0.136∗ 0.044∗ 0.108∗ 0.202∗ 0.080∗
(0.010) (0.029) (0.010) (0.012) (0.034) (0.013)
(K Inﬂows/GDP)t−1× Non-coreb 0.903∗ 0.891∗∗ −0.237 3.645∗ 3.112∗ 1.605∗
(0.182) (0.439) (0.179) (0.233) (0.508) (0.241)
(K Inﬂows/GDP)t−1× CARb 0.672∗ 1.693∗ 0.634∗ 0.928∗ 1.748∗ 0.801∗
(0.046) (0.129) (0.047) (0.052) (0.138) (0.055)
Observations 7,975,254 1,253,718 6,648,229 5,260,236 945,169 4,268,462
R-squared 0.914 0.928 0.921 0.902 0.925 0.908
Bank × ﬁrm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm × quarter F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents results for the regressions (Eq. (1)), for domestic banks only, using quarterly data for all loans over 2005–2013. The lagged values of the following
bank-level characteristics are also controlled for (not reported completely in all speciﬁcations): log(assets), capital adequacy ratio (CAR), liquidity ratio, non-core liabilities ratio,
and return on total assets (ROA). The interacted capital inﬂow and bank-level variables are demeaned before being interacted. Regressions are all weighted-least square, where
weights are equal to the natural logarithm of loans. Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level.
∗ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
∗∗ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
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Fig. 2. Turkish capital inﬂow components, 2003–2013. Notes: This ﬁgure plots the
breakdown of Turkey’s capital inﬂows/GDP ratio into (i) portfolio inﬂows; (ii) other
inﬂows, and (iii) FDI inﬂows over time. All series are four-quarters moving averages.
Source: All data are sourced from the CBRT.
has a potentially direct ability to increase the liquidity of the banks,
thereby affecting their lending capacity upon the inﬂow.
Table 7 presents regressions based on Eq. (1) for the domestic
bank sample, where nowwe interact the bank variables with the dif-
ferent capital inﬂow components14. Column (1)–(3) present results
for the whole sample period, the pre-crisis period, and the post-crisis
period, respectively. The ﬁrst overall message we take away from
looking across all speciﬁcations is that banks show signiﬁcant het-
erogeneity in terms of the sensitivity of their lending to other ﬂows,
regardless of the sample split. Next, looking at column (1) for the
whole sample period, we ﬁnd that lending by larger, more capitalized
and higher non-core banks are more sensitive to the variations in
the other ﬂows. In contrast, heterogeneous responses to lendingwith
respect to portfolio ﬂows are only observed across banks with differ-
ent capital adequacy ratios over the entire period, but not robust to
sub-periods.
We next turn to examining results for the pre- and post-crisis
periods in detail, in columns (2) and (3). We observe that the
response of the bank lending to the other capital ﬂows item, for
which cross-border ﬂows to banks play an important role, varies
with respect to bank size, non-core liabilities and capital adequacy
ratios both before and after the 2008 crisis. Speciﬁcally, banks with
larger size, better capitalization and a higher non-core liabilities
experience a higher procyclicality in their lending in response to
an increase in the other capital ﬂows item. Meanwhile, we do not
observe a clear pattern of heterogeneity in the procyclicality across
different sample periods for portfolio ﬂows. This is not surprising
for the portfolio ﬂows since such ﬂows encompass bond ﬂows into
banks, corporates and the sovereign, and these sectors borrowing
might differ over the cycle, and in particular across normal times and
crisis times as shown by Avdjiev et al. (2017).
6. Conclusion
The literature that analyzes banks and the international transmis-
sion of shocks via banking activity has mostly focused on the sudden
transmission of crisis shocks rather than the slow moving impact of
14 We also control for FDI ﬂows interacted with the different bank variables.
Table 7
Capital inﬂows and bank-level heterogeneity: types of capital inﬂows.
(1) (2) (3)
05Q1–13Q4 05Q1–08Q2 08Q3–13Q4
(Other/GDP)t−1× Sizeb 0.159∗ 0.726∗ 0.0837∗
(0.013) (0.042) (0.012)
(Other/GDP)t−1× Non-coreb 4.624∗ 1.907∗ 2.993∗
(0.229) (0.625) (0.218)
(Other/GDP)t−1× CARb 1.022∗ 0.638∗ 1.158∗
(0.053) (0.178) (0.051)
(Portfolio/GDP)t−1× Sizeb −0.003 −0.006 0.0677∗
(0.021) (0.037) (0.024)
(Portfolio/GDP)t−1× Non-coreb −0.494 5.572∗ −1.293∗∗
(0.420) (0.560) (0.524)
(Portfolio/GDP)t−1× CARb 0.400∗ 1.317∗ −0.143
(0.093) (0.147) (0.110)
Observations 5,260,236 945,169 4,268,462
R-squared 0.902 0.925 0.908
Bank × ﬁrm F.E. Yes Yes Yes
Firm × quarter F.E. Yes Yes Yes
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table presents results for the regressions (Eq. (1)), for different types of
capital inﬂows (‘Portfolio’ and ‘Other’), using quarterly data for all loans over 2005–
2013. The lagged values of the following bank-level characteristics are also controlled
for (not reported completely in all speciﬁcations): log(assets), capital adequacy ratio
(CAR), liquidity ratio, non-core liabilities ratio, and return on total assets (ROA). The
interacted capital inﬂow and bank-level variables are demeaned before being inter-
acted. Bank variables are also interacted with FDI ﬂows, but omitted from the table.
Regressions are all weighted-least square, where weights are equal to the natural
logarithm of loans. Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level.
∗ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
∗∗ Indicates signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
capital ﬂows over the cycle. In this paper we examine how capital
ﬂows affects the local credit supply in emerging markets, and the
bank-level mechanisms behind this international credit channel. For
identiﬁcation, we exploit administrative data from the credit regis-
ter from Turkey over 2005–2013. The use of the credit register is
important given that it contains the universe of bank loans to ﬁrms
in an important emerging market, and allows us to control for time-
varying unobserved ﬁrm shocks, which proxy for credit demand, via
ﬁrm × quarter ﬁxed effects.
Our results show that larger, more capitalized banks with higher
non-core liabilities increase credit supply when capital inﬂows are
higher. Importantly, these results are stronger for domestic banks,
especially in crisis times for banks with more non-core liabilities,
which suggest that stronger local internationally-funded banks can
transmit global cycles and shocks, not just foreign owned banks. This
ﬁnding implies that macroprudential regulation of banks should also
target the way domestic banks are ﬁnanced, in particular non-core
funding.
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